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THE NATURE AND NURTURE OF VIOLENCE: EARLY INTERVENTION
SERVICES FOR THE FAMILIES OF MAOA-Low CHILDREN AS A MEANS
TO REDUCE VIOLENT CRIME AND THE COSTS OF VIOLENT CRIME
JENNIFER BROOKS-CROZIER
In 1993, scientist Hans Brunner discovered that several male members of a
large Dutch family who exhibited behaviors such as impulsive aggression, arson,
and attempted rape possessed a mutant copy of the MAOA gene, the gene that
codes for the production of the enzyme monoamine oxidase A ("MAOA").
Brunner and his colleagues demonstrated that carrier males produced less MA OA,
or were "MAOA-low. " They hypothesized that this MAA deficiency caused
abnormal aggressive behavior in MAOA-low males. Subsequent research,
however, demonstrated that the genetic mutation, acting alone, does not produce
the abnormal, aggressive behavior observed by Brunner and his colleagues. In
2002, Avshalom Caspi and a team of New Zealand-based researchers published a
ground-breaking study that demonstrated that MAOA-low males who experienced
childhood maltreatment were likely to develop abnormal aggressive behavior and
become violent offenders. This Note argues that Brunner and Caspi's research
can and should be used to prevent violent crime and to preserve the sense ofpeace
and safety that is the foundation offree, civilized societies. More specifically, the
Note proposes that states add a screening test for the MAOA-low genotype to their
newborn screening programs and that states then offer "Part C" early
intervention services to families with children who test positive for the genotype.
The screening test would allow states to target a population of children at risk of
criminal behavior. The intervention services-family education and counseling,
home visits, parent support groups, and psychological and social work services-
would prevent those at-risk children from suffering the maltreatment that would
cause them to later develop aggressive, antisocial behavior. This Note examines
the constitutionality and policy implications of the proposed legislation, presents a
rudimentary cost-benefit analysis of the legislation, and ultimately concludes that
it would pass constitutional muster and be a cost-effective public policy.
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THE NATURE AND NURTURE OF VIOLENCE: EARLY INTERVENTION
SERVICES FOR THE FAMILIES OF MAOA-Low CHILDREN AS A MEANS
TO REDUCE VIOLENT CRIME AND THE COSTS OF VIOLENT CRIME
JENNIFER BROOKS-CROZIER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The crimes that have the most devastating effect on a community are
not those motivated by malice, greed, or jealousy, but rather those that
seem to strike at random at a community's innocents-those crimes
without any cognizable or articulable motive. Such crimes chip away at
that sense of peace and safety that is the great end of individuals' entering
into society. The laws established in society are meant to preserve that
sense of peace and safety. Laws, however, are impotent against crime that
is not the product of a rational mind because the law presumes that people
can be persuaded to abide by its dictates.
1
The law's inability to deter crime that is not the product of a rational
mind has fueled, in part, the centuries-old search for a biological basis for
criminal behavior. Scientists, beginning with the phrenologists of the early
nineteenth century, have long speculated that if the propensity to engage in
criminal behavior has a biological basis, perhaps it can be "cured," or,
more ominously, perhaps those who possess that propensity can be
identified and somehow prevented from committing a criminal act.2 As
forensic psychologist Steven Erickson has asserted, scientists have long
* Indiana University, B.A. 1999; Indiana University, M.A. 2002; University of Connecticut
School of Law, J.D. 2012. I am deeply grateful to professors Deborah Calloway, Peter Siegelman,
Loftus Becker, and Paul Chill for their encouragement and thoughtful comments. I would also like to
thank the staff of Volume 44 of the Connecticut Law Review for its patience and hard work throughout
the drafting process. All errors contained herein are mine and mine alone.
1 See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1936) ("[T]he law has been guided by a
robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of
its problems."); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 1961) ("The concept of mens rea,
guilty mind, is based on the assumption that a person has a capacity to control his behavior and to
choose between alternative courses of conduct. This assumption ... is necessary to the maintenance
and administration of social controls."); Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J. L. SC. &
TECH. 27, 65-66 (2010) ("[Ilt is axiomatic that to blame an agent of criminal conduct is to accuse her
of possessing a guilty mind at the time of the offense.").2 See GEORGE COMBE, ELEMENTS OF PHRENOLOGY 36-40, 42-44 (1828) (explaining that the
faculties of "combativeness," "destructiveness," and "secretiveness," determined by "organs" situated
at the "inferior and posterior or mastoid angle of the parietal bone," "immediately above ... the
external opening of the ear," and "at the inferior edge of the parietal bones," respectively, produce
various aggressive or criminal behaviors, such as the propensity to attack, the impulse to destroy, and
"lying, duplicity,.., deceit," and "theft"); FRANCIS GALTON, HEREDITARY GENIUS: AN INQUIRY INTO
ITS LAWS AND CONSEQUENCES 1 (1869) (arguing that humankind can and should select for various
desirable traits-and, it follows, weed out various undesirable traits-among human beings by
breeding them as it breeds dogs or horses).
believed themselves to be better suited for handling criminal justice policy
than lawyers.3
The twenty-first century search for a biological basis for criminal
behavior has manifested itself in the search for a crime gene.4 In 1993,
scientists engaged in that search heralded an important victory. Hans
Brunner discovered that several male members of a large Dutch family
who exhibited behaviors such as impulsive aggression, arson, and
attempted rape possessed a mutant copy of the MA A gene, the gene that
codes for the production of the enzyme monoamine oxidase A
("MAOA").5 Brunner and his colleagues demonstrated that the mutation
caused an MAOA deficiency in carrier males-that is, carrier males
produced less MAOA, 6 or were "MAOA-low."
MAOA metabolizes serotonin, dopamine, and norepinephrine-
neurotransmitters that regulate emotion, sleep, appetite, motivation, reward
and punishment, and the fight-or-flight response.7  In "MAOA-high"
males, serotonin, dopamine, and norepinephrine are released from the
presynaptic neuron into the synaptic cleft in response to a stimulus, bind to
receptors on the postsynaptic neuron creating the neural impulses
necessary to respond to that stimulus, and are then reabsorbed by the
presynaptic neuron and metabolized by MAOA. 8 "MAOA-low" males are
unable to effectively metabolize these neurotransmitters. 9 Brunner and his
colleagues hypothesized that this MAOA deficiency and resulting lack of
MAOA activity caused abnormal aggressive behavior in MAOA-low
males.
10
3 Erickson, supra note 1, at 34 ("[Proponents of neurolaw] consider crime the product of impaired
brains and scientists are best suited for handling criminal justice policy, not lawyers. Once crime is
understood as a behavioral problem rooted in the impaired brains of many unfortunate citizens,
ameliorating crime will properly involve civil remedies instead of criminal ones.").
4 See Michael D. Lemonick & Alice Park, Children and Violence: The Search for a Murder Gene,
TIME, Jan. 20, 2003, at 100 (reporting on experts' search for a genetic explanation for criminal
behavior).
5 H.G. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the Structural
Genefor Monoamine Oxidase A, 262 Sci. 578, 578-79 (1993).6 Id. at 579.
7 THE MEDICAL BIOCHEMISTRY PAGE: BIOCHEMISTRY OF NEUROTRANSMITTERS AND NERVE
TRANSMISSION, http://www.themedicalbiochemistrypage.org/nerves.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
8 A synapse is a junction at which a neuron passes a signal to another cell. Id.
9 Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297
Sci. 851, 851 (2002). Caspi and his colleagues explain that the MAOA enzyme "metabolizes"
neurotransmitters. Id. Nerve impulses are transmitted at synapses by the release of chemicals called
neurotransmitters. As a nerve impulse reaches the end of a presynaptic axon, or cell, molecules of
neurotransmitter are released into the synaptic cleft. The molecules of neurotransmitter then bind to
specific receptors on the surface of the postsynaptic cell. Once the nerve impulse has been transmitted,
the presynaptic cell reabsorbs the molecules of neurotransmitter and they are then metabolized, or
rendered inactive-in the case of epinephrine, norepinephrine, dopanine, and serotonin, by MAOA.
THE MEDICAL BIOCHEMISTRY PAGE, supra note 7.
10 Brunner et al., supra note 5, at 578.
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Subsequent research, however, demonstrated that the genetic mutation,
acting alone, does not produce the abnormal aggressive behavior observed
by Brunner and his colleagues. In 2002, Avshalom Caspi and a team of
New Zealand-based researchers published a ground-breaking study that
demonstrated that MAOA-low males who experienced childhood
maltreatment were far more likely to develop abnormal aggressive
behavior and become violent offenders than their MAOA-high peers.
11
Caspi and his colleagues concluded that monoamine oxidase A tempers the
effect of childhood maltreatment, and that maltreated children who
produce high levels of the enzyme, in other words, those who are "MAOA-
high," are less likely to develop abnormal aggressive behavior.
12
The Brunner and Caspi studies and their progeny have attracted the
rapt attention of legal scholars. At one extreme are scholars who proclaim
that the studies, part of a larger movement within the scientific community
called "the new neuroscience, ' '13 are harbingers of a new legal order, where
the law views brains as "the exclusive agents of behavior[,] ... incapable
of blame because of their mechanical and determined nature." 14  At the
other extreme are scholars who urge a more cautious approach to the new
neuroscience, pointing out that the "mind is [not necessarily] accessible,
measurable, [or] predictable" 15 and that "no one yet really knows what
forms the basis for the myriad of psychopathic behaviors, especially those
where the degree of free will, intention, and self-control by the accused
cannot be fully known."
16
11 Caspi et al., supra note 9, at 853. Caspi and his colleagues called this a "gene-environment (G
x E) interaction[]." Id. at 852.
12 Id. at 853.
13 Erickson, supra note 1, at 36.
14 Id. at28.
15 Id. at 31. Erickson argued that society will ultimately reject the new neuroscience because it,
with its mechanistic accounts of behavior, is divorced from society's intuitive sense of justice. "[T]he
notion of evil," he argued, "is solidly ingrained in our culture and legal traditions." Steven K.
Erickson, Mind Over Morality, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 1555, 1564-65 (2007) (reviewing CHARLES PATRICK
EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL (2006)). People believe that the worst crimes involve
intentionality and wickedness. Professors Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, however, make the
compelling argument that society's intuitive sense of justice is changing. They argue that our sense of
ourselves as free actors, separate from the deterministic processes that work upon the physical world,
will soon go the way of "other similarly narcissistic beliefs that we have cherished in our past: that the
Earth lies at the centre of the universe, that humans are unrelated to other species." Joshua Greene &
Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1781 (2004). What people really
want to know is "[w]as it him, or was it his genes? Was it him, or was it his circumstances?" Id. at
1778-79. And when people come to believe that there is no "him" independent of these other things,
they will no longer seek to distinguish the truly, deeply guilty-the wicked-from those who are mere
victims of genotype and environment for the purpose of meting out punishment, but will rather punish
for practical reasons.
16 James H. Fallon, Neuroanatomical Background to Understanding the Brain of the Young
Psychopath, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 342 (2006). Fallon, a neuroscientist who studies the biology
2011] 535
The studies have also found their way into the courtroom. In March
2009, Polk County, Tennessee prosecutors tried Bradley Waldroup for the
brutal slaying of Leslie Bradshaw.17  Waldroup shot Bradshaw, his ex-
wife's friend, eight times with a 22-caliber rifle and "sliced her head open"
with a machete.18  He then turned his rage on his ex-wife, shooting her in
the back as she attempted to flee, hacking at her with a pocket knife, and
beating her with a shovel.19 Polk County prosecutor Cynthia Lecroy-
Schemel remarked, "[t]here are murders and then there are ... hacking to
death, trails of blood., 20 Trial judge Carroll Ross called the killing "one of
the most senseless, brutal slayings [he had] ever witnessed in [his] entire
career."
21
At trial, Waldroup presented expert testimony to the effect that because
he possessed the MAOA-low variant of the MAQA gene and had been
maltreated as a child, he was "unable to engage in the reflection and
judgment necessary to premeditate the crimes",22 and thus could not have
committed first-degree murder, a crime punishable by death.23  The jury
accepted Waldroup's defense and found him guilty of voluntary
of human behavior at the University of California, discovered in 2006 that he is MAOA-low. He also
discovered that his ancestors include the likes of Thomas Cornell, hanged in 1673 for murdering his
mother, and Lizzie Borden, accused in 1892 of killing her father and stepmother with an axe. Although
Fallon is known for "impetuous, risk-taking behavior," he is not a cold-blooded killer. Fallon has
mused: "I had a charmed childhood .... But if I'd been mistreated as a child, who knows what might
have happened?" Gautam Naik, What's on Jim Fallon's Mind? A Family Secret That Has Been
Murder to Figure Out, WALL STREET J., Nov. 27, 2009, at Al.
17 Waldroup Guilty, Will Not Face Death Penalty, POLK COUNTY NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 25, 2009,
http://www.polknewsonline.com/2009/03/25/TopNewsAValdroupguilty, will not face death penal
ty/4158.html.
18 1d; see also Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Can Your Genes Make You Murder?, NPR (Jul. 1,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 128043329.
19 Waldroup Guilty, supra note 17. Miraculously, Ms. Waldroup survived her ex-husband's
brutal attack.
20 Hagerty, supra note 18.
21 Todd South, Polk County Man Sentenced to 32 Years, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, May
8, 2009, at Al.
22 Waldroup Guilty, supra note 17.
23 Id. The Tennessee Code defines "first-degree murder" as "[the] premeditated and intentional
killing of another." The Code defines "premeditation" as,
an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment .... [T]he intent to kill
must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose
to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The
mental state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must
be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was
sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-13-202 (2010).
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manslaughter. 24  One juror remarked that "[t]here was more to
[Waldroup's] whole life that led to [the killing]"-namely, his genetic
makeup "[a]nd his background-nature vs. nurture." 25 Another juror, who
felt that the expert testimony was a "major factor" in the jury's decision,
mused that Waldroup didn't "tick right," and that "[s]ome people without
[the genetic variant] would react totally different than he would" in similar
circumstances. 26  Judge Ross sentenced Waldroup to six years for the
killing-the maximum allowed under Tennessee law.
This Note does not attempt to add to the voluminous body of
scholarship that explores the legal and social ramifications of the scientific
research that provided the basis for Waldroup's defense. It does not
suggest-or dismiss the possibility-that such research will bring about a
radical overhaul of criminal law's constructions of free will and personal
responsibility. Rather, this Note argues that such research can, and should,
be used to prevent senseless and brutal slayings of the sort recounted
above-to preserve that sense of peace and safety that is the foundation of
free, civilized societies. More specifically, this Note proposes that states
add a screening test for the MAOA-low genotype to their newborn
screening programs and that states then offer "early intervention services"
to families with children who test positive for the genotype. The screening
test would allow states to target those children at risk of criminal behavior.
The intervention services-family education and counseling, home visits,
parent support groups, and psychological and social work services-would
be designed to prevent those at-risk children from suffering the
maltreatment that could cause them to later develop aggressive, antisocial
behavior. The Note examines the constitutionality and policy implications
of the proposed legislation, presents a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis of
the legislation, and ultimately concludes that it would both pass
constitutional muster and be a cost-effective public policy.
II. THE GENOTYPE-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION
Caspi et al.'s study uncovered a powerful interaction between an
individual's genotype and his environment-the effect of childhood
maltreatment on antisocial behavior was significantly greater among males
with the MAOA-low genotype than among males with the MAOA-high
24 Waldroup Guilty, supra note 17. The Tennessee Code defines "voluntary manslaughter" as
"the intentional or knowing killing of another in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation
sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner." TENN. CODE ANN. § 3 9-13-211.
25 Hagerty, supra note 18.
26 id.
27 South, supra note 21. Waldroup received twenty-six additional years for other offenses with
which he had been charged and convicted, including aggravated kidnapping, for a thirty-two year total
sentence. Id.
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genotype. 28 MAOA-low males who experienced childhood maltreatment
had 2.8 times the odds of developing adolescent conduct disorder and 9.8
times the odds of committing a violent crime as MAOA-low males who
had not been maltreated as children. Maltreatment did not confer a similar
risk on MAOA-high males.29 Eighty-five percent of MAOA-low males
who had been severely maltreated as children developed some form of
antisocial behavior,30  and although MAOA-low males who had
experienced childhood maltreatment constituted only twelve percent of the
male cohort, they accounted for forty-four percent of the cohort's violent
convictions, "yielding an attributable risk fraction.., comparable to that of
the major risk factors associated with cardiovascular disease., 31
Recent research drawing on technological innovations in the arena of
magnetic resonance imaging suggests that abnormal neurotransmitter
activity in MAOA-low males subjected to childhood maltreatment may
result in damage to the affected individual's orbital prefrontal cortex-a
region of the brain involved in social interactions, the inhibition of
impulsive behavior, ethics, morality, reward and punishment, regret, and
the projection of future outcomes. 32  If an individual's orbital cortex is
damaged, he is much less capable of inhibiting aggression, violence, and
addiction.
33
When this damage occurs is critical. One study concluded that MAOA
confers a protective effect only early in life, prior to fifteen years of age,
"when the brain is more vulnerable ... to behavioral insults." 34 Another
study asserted that the timing of the injury determines the type of antisocial
behavior manifested. The study's results revealed three broad categories
28 Caspi et al., supra note 9, at 853.
29 1d. MAOA-high males who experienced childhood maltreatment had only 1.54 times higher
odds of developing adolescent conduct disorder and 1.63 times the odds of committing a violent crime
than MAOA-high males who had not been maltreated as children. Id. The Caspi team assessed
adolescent conduct disorder according to criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV) and identified convictions for violent crimes via the Australian and New Zealand
police. Id. at 852.
'o Id. at 853. Caspi and his colleagues acknowledged that antisocial behavior is a "complicated
phenotype" and that methods used to measure it are marked by various strengths and weaknesses. Id.
at 852; see also Guang Guo et al., The VNTR 2 Repeat in MAOA and Delinquent Behavior in
Adolescence and Young Adulthood: Associations and MAOA Promoter Activity, 16 EUR. J. HUMAN
GENETICS 626, 628 (2008) (acknowledging the challenges inherent in measuring delinquency and
crime).
31 Caspi et al., supra note 9, at 853.
32 Fallon, supra note 16, at 347. For an extended discussion of functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) technology and its use in research on the criminal mind, see generally Teneille Brown
& Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal
Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1119 (2010).
33 Fallon, supra note 16, at 347.
14 Yung-yu Huang et al., An Association Between a Functional Polymorphism in the Monoamine
Oxidase A Gene Promoter, Impulsive Traits and Early Abuse Experiences, 29
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1498, 1503 (2004).
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of antisocial behavior. Children who sustain orbital cortex damage prior to
two to three years of life manifest violent behavior "without knowing what
they are doing is wrong;" children who sustain orbital cortex damage after
the second or third year of life through "about puberty" manifest violent
behavior and "know[ ] what they are doing is wrong, but.., cannot control
the impulse to act;" and children who sustain damage occurring after
puberty manifest violent behavior "with full knowledge of the morality and
consequences involved, but with a highly variable ability to inhibit the
impulses" that compel such behavior.
35
There is no one, specific kind of maltreatment that can cause the
damage that leads to later aggressive, antisocial behavior. Caspi et al.
characterized childhood maltreatment as "erratic, coercive, and punitive
parenting, ' 36 or, more specifically, maternal rejection, repeated loss of a
primary caregiver, harsh discipline, physical abuse, or sexual abuse.37
Other researchers, building on Caspi et al.'s work, defined childhood
maltreatment differently, hypothesizing that MAOA-low males are at risk
for developing conduct disorder when exposed to a variety of childhood
adversities. 38 Foley et al., for example, studied the effects of interparental
violence, parental neglect, and inconsistent discipline on MAOA-low
males. 39 The study demonstrated a significant interaction between MAOA
deficiency and each of these three adverse factors.40
These studies suggest that MAOA-low males need not be exposed to
devastating violence in childhood in order to exhibit aggressive, antisocial
behavior later in life. The degree of aggressive, antisocial behavior
exhibited, however, does vary depending on two factors: the effectiveness
with which the individual's MAOA gene is transcribed and the level of
maltreatment to which the individual is exposed.
35 Fallon, supra note 16, at 341.
36 Caspi et al., supra note 9, at 851.
37 Debra L. Foley et al., Childhood Adversity, Monoamine Oxidase A Genotype, and Risk for
Conduct Disorder, 61 ARCHIvE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 738, 738 (2004).
38 Id. at 738-39.
39 Id. at 739. Foley et al. assessed adversities by means of a personal interview. To determine
whether subjects had been exposed to parental neglect, researchers asked subjects' parents (1) whether
anyone had ever told them they were not looking after their children properly; (2) whether anyone had
ever thought that one of the children had become ill because the children had not been looked after
properly; and (3) whether there had been a time when one of the children was very ill but the parent
doubted whether he or she needed to see a doctor. To determine whether subjects had been exposed to
interparental violence, researchers asked subjects (1) whether their parents had ever pushed or shoved
each other during an argument, and (2) whether their parents hit each other when they fought. Finally,
to determine whether subjects had been exposed to inconsistent discipline, researchers asked subjects
whether a parent was strict one day and then the next day did not seem to care whether they broke a
rule or not. Id.
4 Id. at 740. Interestingly, researchers discovered that after controlling for the interaction
between low MAOA activity and childhood adversity and the main effect of adversity, low MAOA
activity was associated with a lower risk of conduct disorder. Id.
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Whether any gene performs its function effectively depends in large
measure on the effectiveness with which the gene's "promoter" transcribes
the gene.41  Research on the MAOA gene has identified a 30-basepair
("bp") variable number tandem repeat ("VNTR") in the promoter region of
the MAOA gene. 42  The 30-bp VNTR can repeat itself 2, 3, 3.5, 4, or 5
times. 43 The 3 and 4 repeats occur more frequently in the population than
the 2, 3.5, or 5 repeats.44 The 3 repeat occurs in approximately one-third of
the male population and the 4 repeat occurs in approximately two-thirds of
the male population.45 Individuals whose genes have 3.5 or 4 repeats of
the VNTR transcribe more efficiently than individuals whose genes have 3
or 5 repeats of the VNTR.46 The 2-repeat sequence of the MAQA promoter
displays the lowest level of promoter activity.47  Guo et al. demonstrated
that males with 2 repeats of the VNTR exhibit delinquent behavior at twice
the rate of males with any of the other variants.48 Caspi et al. and Kim-
Cohen et al. found a higher level of violent behavior for 3 repeats than 4
repeats among males who were maltreated in childhood.49
The level of maltreatment to which a child is exposed also determines
the likelihood that he will later exhibit aggressive, antisocial behavior.
41 A gene's promoter is a region of DNA that promotes, or facilitates, the transcription of that
particular gene. How effectively a promoter transcribes a gene determines how much of a particular
protein is synthesized by the operations of that gene. Transcription is the process by which an
equivalent RNA copy of a sequence of DNA is created. RNA carries information from DNA to the
ribosome, the sites of protein synthesis in the cell. Monoamine oxidase A is a kind of protein. If the
MAOA promoter does not effectively transcribe the gene, then less MAOA will be produced. See
generally BENJAMiN A. PIERCE, GENETICS: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 345-46, 348-49, 358-59 (Jerry
Correa et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008).
42 Guo et al., supra note 30, at 627. A tandem repeat involves multiple copies of an identical
DNA sequence arranged in direct succession in a particular region of a chromosome. A variable
number tandem repeat is a tandem repeat which is repeated a different number of times in different
individuals. The VNTR described by MAOA-gene researchers contains thirty base pairs. A base pair
is composed of two complementary nucleotides: A (adenine)--T (thymine) or C (cytosine)--G
(guanine). A 5-bp VNTR might look something like this: ATTCGATTCGATTCGATTCG (four
repeats). In another individual, the 5-bp VNTR might look like this: ATTCGATTCGATTCG (three
repeats). See generally DANIEL L. HARTL & ELIZABETH W. JONES, GENETICS: ANALYSIS OF GENES
AND GENOMES 67 (7th ed. 2009).
43 Guo et al., supra note 30, at 627.
44 id.
45 See Foley et al., supra note 37, at 740 (reporting that the frequency of each allele in a
population of 514 white male twins from the Virginia Twin Study for Adolescent Behavioral
Development was 2 repeat, 0.39%; 3 repeat, 28.79%; 3.5 repeat, 2.33%; 4 repeat, 68.29%; and 5 repeat,
0.19%); J. Kim-Cohen et al., MAOA, Maltreatment, and Gene-Environment Interaction Predicting
Children's Mental Health: New Evidence and a Meta-Analysis, 11 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 903, 906
(2006) (reporting that the frequency of each allele in a population of 1116 seven-year-old boys in
England and Wales was 2 repeat, 0.2%; 3 repeat, 3 1.9 %; 3.5 repeat, 2.1%; 4 repeat, 64.2%; and 5
repeat, 1.6 %).
46 Guo et al., supra note 30, at 627.
4 7
1 d. at 631-32.
481 Id. at 629.
49 Id. at 632; Kim-Cohen et al., supra note 45, at 910.
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Foley et al. grouped males into four categories: "1" through "4.,,50 Those
in category 4 experienced the most severe maltreatment; those in category
1 experienced the least severe maltreatment. 51 One hundred percent of
MAOA-low males who experienced category-4 maltreatment developed
conduct disorder, whereas only fifteen percent of MAOA-low males who
experienced category-i maltreatment developed conduct disorder.52
Perhaps most significant, no MAOA-high males who experienced
category-4 maltreatment developed conduct disorder.53
Thus whether a male exhibits nonviolent, antisocial behaviors such as
stealing, breaking and entering, and drug dealing, or violent, antisocial
behaviors such as physical fighting, shooting, or stabbing someone,
depends, in part, on both the effectiveness with which the individual's
MAQA gene is transcribed and the level of maltreatment to which the
individual is exposed. In other words, males who possess either the 2-
repeat or 3-repeat sequence of the MAQA promoter and are exposed to
severe childhood maltreatment have been dealt an exceptionally bad hand.
It is difficult at this point to estimate the extent to which maltreated,
MAOA-low males contribute to the violent crime rate in the United States,
in part because states do not currently screen for the MAOA-low genotype.
Using Caspi et al.'s numbers, one might estimate that maltreated, MAOA-
low males account for roughly forty-four percent of the nation's violent
crimes.54 If the states, by means of legislation like that proposed here,
could prevent all of them from suffering the maltreatment that causes them
to later develop aggressive, antisocial behavior, violent crime in the United
States could drop by almost half
III. THE PROPOSED LAW
A. Mandatory Newborn Screening
Although the concept of "mandatory genetic screening" evokes images
of a post-apocalyptic future, not unlike those portrayed in the films
50 Foley et al., supra note 37, at 741 tbl.1.
511d. at 741-42. The level of exposure to childhood maltreatment refers to seven items used to
survey parental neglect, exposure to interparental violence, and inconsistent parental discipline. Id. at
742. 52 
Id at 742 tbl.2.
53 id.
54 Caspi et al., supra note 9, at 853. There are problems extrapolating from New Zealand to the
United States. First, the genetic composition of the New Zealand population is likely different from
that of the United States, at least with respect to the MAOA gene. Second, the incidence of
maltreatment in New Zealand is likely different from that of the United States. Nevertheless, the point
survives. Even if maltreated, MAOA-low males account for far less than forty-four percent of the
nation's violent crimes-say, twenty-five percent-it is a substantial enough number to warrant
government action.
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Minority Report and Gattaca,55 mandatory genetic screening is, in fact,
common.56 Newborn screening began in the United States in the 1960s,
when scientists developed a screening test for phenylketonuria ("PKU").7
58Today, every state has a newborn screening program. 8 These programs
vary widely; the number of genetic and metabolic disorders included in
state screening programs ranges from four to thirty-six.5 9  All states
mandate screening for PKU, and most states mandate screening for several
disorders. 60  At present, however, no state mandates screening for a
genetically-based, environmentally-triggered disorder such as the
abnormal, aggressive behavior caused by the interaction between the
MAOA-low genotype and childhood maltreatment.
This Note proposes that states add to their newborn screening
programs a mandatory screening test for the MAOA-low genotype. 61 The
policies and practices governing the administration of the test would
conform to those already in place in most states.62  All children, male and
female, would be tested within forty-eight hours of birth. If the child were
delivered at home, and the birth were not attended by a physician, the
person registering the birth would be responsible for ensuring that the
screening test be performed within forty-eight hours of the child's birth.63
55 MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002); GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997); see
also Robert D. Stone, Note, The Cloudy Crystal Ball: Genetics, Child Abuse, and the Perils of
Predicting Behavior, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1557, 1558, 1563 (2003) (analyzing Minority Report and
Gattaca as commentaries on preventative policing and genetic determinism).56 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-449, NEWBORN SCREENING:
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PROGRAMS 1, 8 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03449.pdf.
57Id. at 4. PKU is a genetic disorder characterized by the inability to process the protein
phenylalanine. If left untreated, PKU can result in symptoms including brain damage and severe
mental retardation. See generally MEDLINEPLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA: PHENYLKETONURIA,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/phenylketonuria.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
58 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 1.591 Id. at 1, 8.
60 Id. at 8-9. Connecticut, for example, mandates that newborns be screened for PKU,
galactosemia, congenital hypothyroidism, hemoglobinopathies, maple syrup urine disease,
homocystinuria, biotinidase deficiency, and congenital adrenal hyperplasia. STATE CONN. DEP'T PUB.
HEALTH, GENETICS NEWBORN LABORATORY SCREENING PROGRAM FAMILY FACT SHEET 1 (2005),
available at http://www.ct.gov/dph/lib/dph/family-health/newborn-screening/pdf/nbs-family-fact
sheet.pdf.
61 Scientists consider the 2-repeat, 3-repeat, and 5-repeat alleles "MAOA-low," because the
promoter regions of these alleles transcribe the MAOA gene less effectively and result in the
underproduction or lack of production of MAOA. Recall that the 2-repeat and 5-repeat alleles are very
uncommon in the general population-0.2% and 1.6%, respectively-and that the 3-repeat allele is
very common-31.9%. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
62 Most states have adopted similar practices for administering their screening programs. GAO
REPORT, supra note 56, at 8.
63 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-519(2) (2009) ("If a birth is not attended by a physician and the
infant does not have a physician, the person registering the birth shall cause such tests to be performed
within the period and in the manner prescribed by the [Department of Health and Human Services].").
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The cell sample would be extracted by a buccal smear, as opposed to a
blood draw, and then sent to a laboratory where technicians would examine
the sample for the relevant genetic variant.
64
Those who administered the screening test would directly notify the
child's health-care provider and the state's department of health of an
abnormal test result.65 The health-care provider would inform the child's
parent or guardian of the result, educate the parent or guardian regarding
the nature of and prognosis for an MAOA deficiency, outline a plan of
treatment for the family, and confirm that treatment had begun. The state,
too, would follow up with the child's parent or guardian to refer the family
for treatment and encourage participation.
If parents refused to submit their child for screening, the state would
bring an action against them to compel them to comply. If the state were
successful, it would obtain a court order directing the parents to submit
their child for screening as required by the statute. The statute would allow
for no exceptions.
A clear security issue is presented by this scenario. This Note
proposes a set of comprehensive confidentiality measures to ensure the
child's protected health information is not disclosed to the general public.
A set of protections along the following lines would likely suffice. First,
test results would be delivered to a "receiving room" at the state's health
department each month. A staff member would sort, code, and log the
results and then take them to another room where the data would be
entered into a computer. Thereafter, the results would be returned to the
receiving room to be retained in a vault for a five-year period and then
destroyed. The receiving room would be surrounded by a locked wire
fence and protected by an alarm system. The screening-test data would be
encrypted and the files containing the data password protected. When the
files were accessed, the computer would be run "off-line" so that no
terminal outside of the computer room could read or record the protected
information. Further, public disclosure of the screening-test results would
be expressly prohibited by statute and by health department regulation.
Violation of the prohibitions would carry a stiff penalty, up to one year in
prison or a $2000 fine.66
One might question the wisdom of testing both male and female
children. The MAOA gene is located on the X chromosome. Thus, males,
64 A buccal smear is a process in which a medical provider or technician uses a small brush or
cotton swab to collect a sample of cells from the inside surface of the subject's cheek. MEDLINEPLUS
MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA: BUCCAL SMEAR, supra note 57.
65 Fewer than half of states require that test administrators notify parents directly of an abnormal
test. GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 3, 13.
66 Confidentiality measures adapted from those outlined in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594-595
(1977). In Whalen, the Court held these measures "evidence[d] a proper concern with, and protection
of, the individual's interest in privacy." Id. at 605.
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who have only one X chromosome, possess only one copy of the gene,
whereas females, who have two X chromosomes, possess two copies of the
gene. Brunner et al. discovered that MAOA activity in carrier females was
67not different from that of noncarrier females or unrelated controls. He
speculated that this was because carrier females possessed at least one
normal, perhaps highly active, copy of the MAOA gene.68 If carrier
females are not vulnerable to maltreatment in the way that carrier males
are, there seems little justification for subjecting them to the screening test.
States, however, have an interest in identifying female carriers, who would
benefit from genetic counseling and other supportive services. A genetic
counselor, for example, could educate the female carrier about the MAOA-
low genotype and its manifestations; assess the carrier's risk of passing the
genotype on to children; and explain what kinds of supervision and
prevention strategies, like early intervention services, might mitigate the
risks associated with the MAOA-low genotype. Moreover, there is an
extremely rare version of the MAOA-low variant-occurring in
approximately 0.2% of the general population-that affects both male and
female carriers.6 9  Carriers of this genetic mutation exhibit abnormal
aggressive behavior even in the absence of childhood maltreatment.7 °
Failing to screen females would thus result in the inability to identify those
females afflicted by this rare genetic mutation and the inability to offer
their families essential supportive services.
B. Offering State Support and Supervision
That a state would supervise families with children who test positive
for genetic disorders sounds even more like a science-fiction storyline than
does mandatory genetic screening. Such supervision, however, is not
without precedent. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA") governs how states and public agencies provide special
education and related services to children with disabilities from birth to age
twenty-one.7 1
67 Brunner et al., supra note 5, at 579.
68 Id. If a female possessed two mutant copies of the MA0A gene, she would likely express the
traits associated with the mutation. Generally, however, females are protected from X-linked traits
because those traits are recessive and because females often express only one X chromosome-the
other a "Barr body," an inactive X chromosome. See generally ETHEL SLOANE, BIOLOGY OF WOMEN
133 (Cathy L. Esperti et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002).
69 Kim-Cohen et al., supra note 45, at 906; Guo et al., supra note 30, at 631-32.
70 Guo et al., supra note 30, at 631-32.
71 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, 1431-1440 (2006). The IDEA is "spending clause" legislation-that is, it
only applies to states that accept federal funding under its provisions. The IDEA defines a "child with
a disability" as a child "with mental retardation, hearing impairments . .. speech or language
impairments, visual impairments... serious emotional disturbance... orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and who, by reason
thereof, needs special education and related services." Id. § 1401(3)(A).
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States that accept federal funds under "Part C" of the IDEA are
required to offer early intervention services to all children, from birth
through age three, who experience developmental delay or who are
diagnosed with a mental or medical condition that has a high probability of
resulting in developmental delay-such as chromosomal abnormalities,
genetic or congenital disorders, or severe sensory impairments.7 2 States
may serve "at risk" children-children with biomedical risks such as low
birth weight, or environmental risks such as parental substance abuse,
poverty, or child abuse.73
This Note proposes that states that accept federal funds under the
IDEA be required to offer Part C early intervention services to families
with children who test positive for the MAOA-low genotype. There is no
case law that suggests that testing positive for the MAOA-low genotype
constitutes a "diagnosed mental or medical condition that has a high
probability of resulting in developmental delay, 74 within the meaning of
the IDEA. This is not to say that an MAOA-low child would not be
eligible for early intervention services as an "at risk" child. However, the
majority of states serve only those children they are required to serve, 75 and
the group of states that routinely serves at-risk children is growing ever
smaller in the face of growing state budget constraints.7 6 Congress, then,
would need to amend Part C of the IDEA to ensure that families with
MAOA-low children are offered early intervention services.
Early intervention services for an MAOA-low child would look much
like those for any child with a diagnosed mental or medical condition, but
with some significant differences.77 Ordinarily, children are referred to an
early intervention program by their by their parents, or in some cases by
their public school. Where a child receives an abnormal test result for the
MAOA-low genotype, however, the child and his or her family would be
referred to the program directly by the medical provider that conducted the
72
Id. §§ 1400, 1401(3)(A), 1431-1440.
7 3 U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. CHILDREN & FAMILIES, NAT'L SURVEY OF
CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING: No. 8: NEED FOR EARLY INTERVENTION SERVICES AMONG
INFANTS AND TODDLERS IN CHILD WELFARE 1, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/
abuse neglect/nscaw/reports/need earlyintervention/earlyintervention.pdf. As of 2003, the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA") requires that infants and toddlers exposed to
maltreatment be referred for Part C early intervention services. Id.
" 20 U.S.C. § 1432.
75 Id. Eight jurisdictions currently serve at-risk children: Hawaii, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, California, New Mexico, West Virginia, American Samoa, and Guam. Id. at 1, 6.
76 Telephone Interview with Linda Goodman, Dir., Connecticut Birth-to-Three System (Mar. 25,
2011).
77 The program described in the ensuing paragraphs is based on New York State's Early
Intervention Program. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T HEALTH, THE EARLY INTERVENTION PROGRAM: A
PARENT'S GUIDE, http://www.health.state.ny.us/publications/0532/welcome.htm (last visited Apr. 7,
2011).
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screening test. The state would recommend that the child's family
participate in the program and would follow up to encourage participation.
The program's early intervention official would then assign an initial
service coordinator to the family. The initial service coordinator would
conduct an initial meeting with the family, at which he or she would
educate the family about early intervention services and inform the family
of its rights under the early intervention program.78  The initial service
coordinator would then conduct a thorough evaluation of the family and
begin gathering information which would serve as the basis for the
family's individualized family service plan ("IFSP").
After the evaluation was complete, the initial service coordinator
would conduct an IFSP meeting with the family, at which the coordinator,
in consultation with the family, would specify which services the family
required, develop a detailed plan of services (the IFSP), and identify an
"ongoing service coordinator." Because the goal of intervention services
for the MAOA-low child would be to prevent the maltreatment that causes
later abnormal, aggressive behavior, the centerpiece of an IFSP for a
family with an MAOA-low child would be family support services and
supervision. The ongoing service coordinator would administer a service
plan that would eradicate the adverse factors-maternal rejection, harsh or
inconsistent discipline, physical abuse, sexual abuse, interparental
violence, and parental neglect-known to trigger aggressive, antisocial
behavior in MAOA-low children. Possible services would include family
training, counseling, home visits, parent support groups, medical services,
psychological services, social work services, and transportation and related
costs for indigent families.
Semiannually or annually, the ongoing service coordinator would
78 The New York State Early Intervention Program lists the following parents' rights:
[T]o say yes or no to having your child evaluated or screened and taking part in a
family assessment; to say yes or no to participating in the Early Intervention
Program without risking the right to take part in the future; to say yes or no to
any certain type of early intervention service without risking your right to other
types of early intervention services; to keep information about your family
private; to look at and change your child's written record under the Early
Intervention Program; to be told by your Early Intervention Official about any
possible changes in your child's evaluation or other early intervention services
before any changes are made; to take part-and ask others to take part-in all
meetings where decisions will be made about changes in your child's evaluation
or services; to use due process procedures to settle complaints; to an explanation
of how your insurance may be used to pay for early intervention services.
NEW YORK STATE DEP'T HEALTH, Your Rights as a Parent in the Early Intervention Program, THE
EARLY INTERVENTION PROGRAM: A PARENT'S GUIDE, http://www.health.state.ny.us/publications/
0532/rightsl.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
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conduct an IFSP Review, at which the coordinator, again in consultation
with the family, would determine whether additional services were
required or whether the child should be discharged from the program
entirely.
IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The legislation proposed herein implicates various constitutional
protections, including the First Amendment's right to freely exercise one's
religion, the Fourteenth Amendment's right to direct the education and
upbringing of one's children, the Fourteenth Amendment's right to
privacy, and the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unlawful
searches and seizures. A court hearing a challenge to the proposed
legislation under each of these constitutional guarantees would have to
begin by scrutinizing the public interest in mandating newborn screening
for the MAOA-low genotype and offering early intervention services to
families with MAOA-low children. The court would then need to weigh
the public interest against the private interest being asserted.
The Supreme Court, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,79 held
that the school district had demonstrated a compelling need to conduct
random drug testing of the district's student athletes because the problem
posed by student-athlete drug use was real and substantial, and because the
means the school district employed to address the problem were
effective.80 In attempting to articulate the public interest in mandating
newborn screening for the MAOA-low genotype and offering early
intervention services to families with MAOA-low children, this Note asks
those same questions: whether the problem posed by MAOA-low males is
real and substantial, and whether the means employed to address the
problem-mandatory screening and subsequent participation in
intervention services-would be effective. This analytical framework
resembles that which state legislatures use when determining whether to
add a particular disorder to their newborn screening programs: states ask
whether the disorder occurs frequently in the general population, can be
screened for, and can be treated.81
Widely screened-for genetic disorders, like PKU and sickle-cell
anemia, present real and substantial problems and are susceptible to
treatments such as diet and medication. 82 Screening for the MAOA-low
genotype, however, presents unique difficulties. First, a child who tests
7 9 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
'0 Id. at 660, 661, 664-65.
81 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 2.
82 MEDLINEPLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA: PHENYLKETONURIA, supra note 57; NAT'L HEART,
LUNG & BLOOD INST., How Is Sickle Cell Anemia Treated?, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-
topics/topics/sca/treatment.htmI (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
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positive for a mutation of the HBB, or hemoglobin, gene is going to
develop sickle-cell anemia and its various debilitating complications. A
child who tests positive for the MAOA-low genotype, however, is not
likely to develop aggressive, antisocial behavior unless he is maltreated. In
fact, in the absence of maltreatment, the MAOA-low child is less likely to
exhibit violent behavior than the MAOA-high child.83  Second, the
aggressive, antisocial behavior to which the MAOA-low genotype
predisposes MAOA-low males is not treatable in the same ways as PKU or
sickle-cell anemia are. A physician cannot prescribe a specific dietary
regimen or antibiotics in order to prevent a child from becoming a violent
psychopath.84  Despite these unique difficulties, the following analysis
demonstrates that the public interest in screening newborns for the MAOA-
low genotype is, in fact, compelling.
A. A Real Problem
The 3-repeat variant of the MAOA gene occurs in approximately one-
third of the white male population. 85 In contrast, PKU, for which every
state mandates screening, occurs in about .007% of the general
population. 86  But the MAOA-low genotype alone does not produce
abnormal aggressive behavior. If not maltreated, the MAOA-low child is
not only not likely to develop aggressive, antisocial behavior, he is likely
87to be less aggressive than his MAOA-high peers. Thus, in order to
determine how often the "genetic disorder" occurs in the population, one
must measure the number of MAOA-low children who are maltreated.
Caspi et al.'s study of 1037 New Zealand children included about sixty-
five males (twelve percent of the male cohort, six percent of the entire
cohort) who were MAOA-low and had suffered maltreatment. 88  This
frequency is still far greater than the .007% frequency that legislators have
83 Foley et al., supra note 37, at 742.
84 This goes without saying, in part because an individual's experience-as this Note
demonstrates-plays a central role in determining whether he or she develops violent psychopathic
tendencies, and diet and antibiotics do not act in any meaningful way on the experiences-such as
childhood maltreatment-that produce violent behavior. James Fallon reports that "the core violent
psychopathic condition [that results from damage to an individual's orbital prefrontal cortex] appears to
still be impenetrable to intervention or prevention." Fallon, supra note 16, at 342.
85 Foley et al., supra note 37, at 740; Kim-Cohen et al., supra note 45, at 906.86 GEORGIANNE L. ARNOLD, GENETICS OF PHENYLKETONURIA: EPIDEMIOLOGY, http://emedicine.
medscape.com/article/947781-overview#a0199 (last visited Sept. 2, 2011).
87 Foley et al., supra note 37, at 742 ("After we controlled for [the interaction between genotype
and environmental adversity], the low-activity MAO-A genotype was associated with a significantly
lower risk for conduct disorder.").
88 Caspi et al., supra note 9, at 852-53.
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determined justifies mandatory screening for PKU.89
B. A Substantial Problem
MAOA-low males who experience childhood maltreatment pose a
substantial threat to the health, safety, and welfare of a state's residents.
Researchers at Iowa State University recently reported that every
aggravated assault costs the United States $145,379; every rape costs
$448,532; every murder costs $17,252,656. 90 "That means in
2009... murder cost the United States almost $263 billion-nearly as
much the federal government annually spends on Medicaid." 91
Researchers included in their calculations costs such as damaged property,
lost careers, prison upkeep, lawyer fees, more frequent police patrols, more
complicated alarm systems, and more expensive life-insurance plans.92
The obvious significance of these statistics is that every dollar a state
spends on crime is a dollar a state does not spend on health, education,
welfare, pensions, transportation, or infrastructure-all expenditures which
directly benefit the health, safety, and welfare of a state's residents.
These statistics are more significant because they are a concrete
manifestation of the intangible costs of violent crime-foremost among
them the loss of that sense of peace and safety that is the foundation of
free, civilized society. And they say nothing of the grievous price paid for
violent crime by the victims themselves. It is easy to discuss these
89 As noted, there are problems extrapolating from New Zealand to the United States. But again,
the point survives, because even supposing the United States frequency is only one percent (twelve
times lower than in New Zealand), it is still 142 times higher than for PKU.
90 Matt DeLisi et al., Murder by Numbers: Monetary Costs Imposed by a Sample of Homicide
Offenders, 21 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 501, 506 (2010). DeLisi et al.'s study made use
of the monetization procedures developed in a seminal study by Vanderbilt University Professor Mark
Cohen, Mark A. Cohen, The Monetary Value of Saving a High-Risk Youth, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY, 5-33 (1998), with one significant difference. In addition to calculating victim costs,
justice-system costs, and the opportunity cost of the offender's time, i.e., lost productivity, DeLisi et al.
calculated a "willingness-to-pay," or WTP, cost. DeLisi et al., supra, at 505. In his 1998 study, Cohen
acknowledged that "[a]n intrinsic limitation of monetized cost estimates of crime is that they cannot
fully capture ... [pain and suffering costs]." Id. Cohen et al. recognized, however, that "individuals
are willing to pay real dollars and expend real resources to avoid the pain, suffering, and lost quality of
life associated with becoming a crime victim." Cohen et al., supra, at 7. To increase the accuracy of
their cost of crime estimates, DeLisi et al. calculated WTP estimates-"the amount of money that
citizens would be willing to pay to prevent crimes." DeLisi et al., supra, at 505. WTP estimates
include "collateral costs," "prevention expenditures for personal security, avoidant behaviors to
safeguard against victimization, third-party costs of insurance, and government welfare programs." Id.
The cost of murder, then, is $4,712,769 in victim costs, $307,355 injustice costs, $143,432 in offender
productivity costs, and $12,089,100 in WTP costs-$17,252,656 total. Id. at 506.
91 Annie Lowrey, True Crime Costs: Does Every Murder in the United States Really Cost Society
$17 Million?, SLATE, Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2271951 (last visited Nov. 24, 2010). A
lengthy discussion of the costs of violent crime to society is beyond the scope of this Note. These
statistics are merely meant to give a sense of the tangible cost of violent crime to society.
92 Id.
2011] 549
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
intangible costs in the abstract and, as a consequence, fail to give them the
weight they deserve. One need only watch an interview with Dr. William
Petit, the husband and father whose wife and daughters were brutally
murdered during a home invasion in Cheshire, Connecticut in 2007, to get
a sense of the soul-rending grief, the all-consuming emotional and
intellectual devastation wrought by violent crime.
93
C. An Effective Means to Address the Problem
As one scholar pointed out, mandatory genetic screening statutes have
attracted "[1]ittle controversy" because "[t]he tests . . . used are highly
accurate., 94 An effective screening test for the MAOA-low genotype does
exist. Test administrators would use a DNA-based test to screen the child
for the MAOA-low variant. 95  It goes without saying, however, that
"[i]dentifying a child's illness or potential illness does him or her no good
unless treatment is actually available and administered., 96  Indeed,
Massachusetts mandates genetic screening only for currently treatable
disorders.97 Again, a physician cannot prescribe antibiotics or a specific
dietary regimen in order to prevent a child from becoming a violent
psychopath.98 Nevertheless, a child can benefit from early detection if that
child's family participates in early intervention services. 99 While early
intervention services are not what we traditionally think of as "treatment,"
they may be the only means of preventing a genetically based,
environmentally triggered behavioral disorder.
Studies show that at least some early intervention programs do work. 100
Five major studies have demonstrated that at-risk children who participate
in early intervention programs are much less likely to exhibit aggressive,
antisocial behavior as adolescents and adults than at-risk children who do
not. 10 1 In 1993, for example, Schweinhart et al. conducted a study of 123
93 "How Life Goes on for Dr. William Petit," Interview by Oprah Winfrey with Dr. William Petit
(Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/William-Petit-Life-Goes-on-Video.
94 Francy E. Foral, Note, Necessity's Sharp Pinch: Parental and States' Rights in Conflict in an
Era of Newborn Genetic Screening, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 109, 110 (2006).
95 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
96 Foral, supra note 94, at 117.
97 id.
98 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
99 Recall that MAOA confers a protective effect only early in life. See supra notes 34-54 and
accompanying text.
10 0 JONATHAN CRANE & MALLORY BARG, COALITION FOR EVIDENCE-BASED POL'Y, Do EARLY
INTERVENTION STUDIES REALLY WORK? 2 (2003); John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating
Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-
19, 21 (1998).
101 CRANE & BARG, supra note 100, at 5. Crane and Barg also report that:
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African-American children born in poverty who had, between the ages of
three and four, attended the HighScope Perry Preschool in Ypsilanti,
Michigan. 10 2  Student-teacher ratios were very low (one teacher to five
students), teachers made weekly ninety-minute home visits to every
family, and all teachers were certified in both early childhood and special
education. At age twenty-seven, children who had attended Perry
Preschool earned more, were more likely to own a home and be married,
and were less likely to bear a child out of wedlock or receive welfare
benefits than similarly situated children who had not attended the school.1 °3
Most significant, the program cut the total number of arrests in half and
reduced the rate of "hard-core criminality (defined as an individual having
five or more arrests) by four-fifths, from thirty-five percent to seven
percent."
10 4
D. A Compelling Interest
The "disorder" occurs frequently in the population, can be screened
for, and is treatable. The threat posed by MAOA-low males is real and
substantial and the means adopted by states to confront that threat-
mandatory newborn screening for the MAOA-low genotype followed by
intervention services-is likely to be effective. Thus a court is likely to
find that the state interest in mandating newborn screening for the MAOA-
low genotype is compelling.
V. THE PRIVATE INTERESTS
After scrutinizing the public interest in mandating newborn screening
The people who, 15 or 20 years earlier, had spent a year or two in high quality
pre-schools behaved a lot differently than the ones who hadn't. Participants in
these programs committed fewer crimes. Some studies also found that the
programs reduced other problems such as welfare dependence, dropping out of
school, out of wedlock childbearing, or drug abuse. In many cases, the sizes of
these impacts were quite dramatic. The fact that these programs had such effects
among high-risk populations suggests that if carried out on a national scale, they
would have the potential to reduce the incidence of some of our nation's worst
social problems by large amounts.
Id
1
02 HighSope Perry Preschool Study, HIGHSCOPE, http://www.highscope.org/content.asp?
contentid=219 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
103 Id.
104 CRANE & BARG, supra note 100, at 10. It should be noted that the Perry Preschool program
had only about one hundred students enrolled. See supra text accompanying note 102. There is no
guarantee that it could work well on as large a scale as that envisioned here. Moreover, times have
changed, so even if the program worked in the 1960s, there is no guarantee it would work as well now.
See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 100, at 15 n.36 (urging caution in drawing conclusions about
the efficacy of early childhood intervention programs).
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for the MAOA-low genotype and offering early intervention services to
families with MAOA-low children, a court should then weigh that public
interest against the private interests embodied in each of the afore-
mentioned constitutional guarantees-for example, the private interest in
freely exercising one's religion or directing the education and upbringing
of one's children.
A. First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion
The Supreme Court, in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,10 5 held that an individual's religious beliefs
do not excuse him from compliance with a "neutral law of general
applicability" on the ground that the law requires conduct that his religion
prohibits. 10 6 A law is neutral and generally applicable when it does not aim
to "infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious [character]"
or "impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief'-that
is, when it has only the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious
practice. 107 Such a law is subject to rational basis review: it must serve a
legitimate governmental interest and be reasonably calculated to achieve
its end.108
In addition, in Douglas County v. Anaya,1°9 a mother and father
brought suit alleging that a Nebraska screening statute that mandated that
their infant daughter be screened for various metabolic and genetic
disorders violated their First Amendment right to freely practice their
religion. 110 The Anayas believed that their daughter's lifespan would be
shortened if blood were drawn from her body.111 The Nebraska Supreme
Court rejected the Anayas' argument, holding that the screening statute
was a neutral law of general applicability because it was "generally
applicable to all babies born in the state[,] . . . [did] not discriminate as to
which babies must be tested," and was not "directed at religious practices
or beliefs."'1 2 Thus the statute was subject to rational basis review and was
' 494 U.S. 872 (1990).106 
Id. at 879. Congress responded to the Court's decision in Smith by voting to pass the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") of 1993, which asserts that a neutral law of general applicability
can burden a religion as much as a law which targets that religion. The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb4 (2006). The law attempted to reinstate strict scrutiny
review of laws, even neutral ones, claimed to have violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Id. In City of Boerne v. Flores, however, the Court ruled that RFRA was
unconstitutional. 521 U.S. 507, 533-35 (1997).
107 San Jose Christian College v. Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Church
of Lukuni Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Haileah, 508 U.S. 520, 545 (1993)).
10 8Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531, 545.
109 694 N.W.2d 601 (Neb. 2005).
1 0 Id. at 603.
111 Id. at 604.112
Id at 608.
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constitutional because there was a rational basis for the law. 113 The court
reasoned that Nebraska had a legitimate interest in "the health and welfare
of all children born in Nebraska" and in "the potential social burdens
created by children . . . not identified and tested" and held that the
screening statute was reasonably calculated to safeguard such health and
welfare and to prevent such social burdens.
114
Like the Anayas, parents who have challenged mandatory genetic
screening laws under the First Amendment Free Exercise clause have
generally objected to the requirement that their child's blood be drawn. 115
The cell sample to be tested pursuant to the legislation proposed here
would be extracted by a cheek swab. It is difficult to imagine that such a
minimally invasive procedure could conflict with any religious practice or
precept. A court confronted with such a First Amendment free-exercise
challenge would first need to determine whether the screening statute is a
"neutral law of general applicability."'1 16  Because the proposed statute
applies to all newborns and does not target specific religious practices or
beliefs, it would likely be considered neutral. A court would then subject
the legislation to rational basis review. Because the government interest is
compelling, let alone legitimate, and the means chosen to effect that
interest are reasonable, 117 the legislation should survive a First Amendment
free-exercise challenge.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Parental Rights
In Meyer v. Nebraska,118 the Supreme Court recognized the "natural
duty" and right of parents to control their children's upbringing and direct
their children's education. 119 The Court held that this right may not be
interfered with by legislation that is arbitrary or without reasonable relation
to some legitimate public purpose.120 Some twenty years later, in Prince v.
Massachusetts,1 21 a woman convicted of providing her nine-year-old
daughter with religious propaganda to sell on the street to passersby
113 id.
114 id.
115 See, e.g., Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132 (D. Neb. 2006) ("The Spierings
sincerely believe that subjecting a child to the pain and trauma of a blood draw within seven days of
birth violates the religious precept of 'Silent Birth'...."); Anaya, 694 N.W.2d at 604 ("The Anayas
declined to submit [their daughter] for the screening, stating that it was in direct conflict with their
sincerely held religious beliefs that life is taken from the body if blood is removed from it.").
116 Emp't Div., Dep't Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
117 See supra text accompanying notes 79-104.
118 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
119 Id. at 399-400.
120 Id.; see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 514 (1925) (holding that a parent's
constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of his or her children may not be abridged by
legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within competency of state).
121 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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invoked Meyer in support of her argument that Massachusetts had violated
her fundamental right to direct the upbringing and education of her
children. 122 The Court acknowledged that "the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents" 123 but underscored that the state as
parens patriae might regulate the family in the public interest-for
example, by circumscribing a parent's control over his or her children by
requiring school attendance or regulating or prohibiting child labor. 124 The
state's "authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his
claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience.
'
"
125
The Court cited the vulnerability of children to "impending restraints and
dangers" and their importance to the growth and development of
democratic society as justifications for the broad authority states exercise
over them. 126
The Supreme Court has not yet decided that the custody and care of
one's children are among those fundamental rights whose infringement
merits strict scrutiny.1 27 Courts reason that applying strict scrutiny to laws
that infringe parents' right to educate and raise their children as they see fit
would "tilt the table in favor of the rights of parents and against the safety
of children., 128 Thus, laws that infringe parents' right to educate and raise
their children as they see fit are subject to rational basis review. As the
Court instructed in Meyer, the legislation must bear some reasonable
relation to a legitimate public purpose.
129
In Spiering v. Heineman, a mother and father brought suit alleging that
the same Nebraska screening statute at issue in Anaya violated their
Fourteenth Amendment right to direct the custody and care of their
children. 130 The Spierings, Scientologists, believed that subjecting a child
to "the pain and trauma" of a blood test within seven days of birth violated
the religious precept of "Silent Birth" and could cause the child to suffer
physical or mental injury. 131
The District Court for the District of Nebraska ruled against the
Spierings, holding that the screening statute survived rational basis
122 
Id. at 165-66.
123 Id. at 166.
124 id.
125 Id. (internal citations omitted).
126 Id. at 168 ("The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of
adults .... A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens .... It may secure this against impending restraints and
dangers.").
127 Douglas Cnty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 607 (Neb. 2005).
128 Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1140 (D. Neb. 2006).
129 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
130 Spiering, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. The screening statute at issue both here and in Anaya was
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-519 (2009).
131 Spiering, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
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review.132 The court reiterated the well-established principle that "a state is
not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with
children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized" '133 and held
that Nebraska had a legitimate interest in safeguarding the health of
children and that the newborn screening program was reasonably
calculated to achieve the state's interest.
134
A court confronted with a Fourteenth Amendment parental-rights
challenge would also subject the legislation to rational basis review. While
the Fourteenth Amendment does guarantee a parent's right to control the
"custody, care and nurture" of his children, 135 a court will not "tilt the table
in favor of the rights of parents and against the safety of children" by
applying strict scrutiny. 136 Thus, again, because the government interest is
compelling-a higher burden, even, than the "legitimate" interest that is
necessary-and the means chosen to effectuate that interest are reasonable,
the legislation should survive a Fourteenth Amendment parental-rights
challenge.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court first recognized a fundamental right to privacy in
Griswold v. Connecticut.137  Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
asserted that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. 138  The cases
traditionally regarded as protecting individuals' privacy implicate two
different interests: the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
and the interest in independence in making important decisions.
1. Avoiding Disclosure of Personal Matters
In Whalen v. Roe,13 9 the Supreme Court held that a New York statute
that required that the names and addresses of patients prescribed opiates
and other commonly abused drugs be recorded in a centralized computer
database did not "pose a sufficiently grievous threat" to patients' interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters "to establish a constitutional
violation., 140 Patients and physicians argued that "the mere existence in
readily available form of . . . information about patients' use of [the]
132 Id. at 1141.
133 Id. at 1139-40 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)).
134 1d. at 1140-41.
131 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).136 Spiering, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
137 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
138 Id. at 484 (internal citations omitted).
139 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
14 Id. at 600, 603-04.
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drugs" constituted a violation of patients' right to privacy. 141 There was a
"genuine concern," they argued, that patients' use of the drugs would
become public and that they would be stigmatized as drug addicts. 142 The
Court acknowledged that public disclosure of information contained in the
database could come about in various ways. For instance, the Court noted
that Health Department employees could deliberately or negligently fail to
maintain proper security.143  The Court concluded, however, that the
security provisions of the statute were adequate to guard against such
contingencies. 144 The Court underscored that,
disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to
hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public
health agencies are often an essential part of modem
medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect
unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring
such disclosures to representatives of the State having
responsibility for the health of the community, does not
automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of
privacy. 145
The Third Circuit has provided perhaps the most articulate and,
arguably, accurate interpretation of Whalen. In United States v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,146 the Third Circuit concluded that the Court
in Whalen had established a constitutional right to privacy in medical
records-but that the right was not absolute. 147 A state could gain access
to an individual's medical records if the state advanced a need to acquire
the information in order to safeguard the public health, safety, or welfare-
that is, if the state were engaged in the "reasonable exercise of its broad
police powers." 148  The court in Westinghouse pointed out that, in
determining whether an intrusion into the "zone of privacy surrounding
141 Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
142 
id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 602.
146 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
147 Id. at 578. In Westinghouse, the court called attention to the public's increasing concern over
the "governmental accumulation of data and the ability of government officials to put information
technology to uses detrimental to individual privacy." Id. at 576. The court then remarked that public
concern was particularly justified where the data to be gathered was an individual's medical
information: "Information about one's body and state of health [has a special character and] is [a]
matter which the individual is ... entitled to retain within the 'private enclave where he may lead a
private life."' Id. at 577 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank, J., dissenting)).
148 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598; see also Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
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medical records" was permissible, courts generally weighed the state's
interest in disclosure against the individual's privacy interest. 149 Factors
that courts considered in balancing the competing interests included
[t]he type of record requested, the information it does or
might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent
nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the
relationship in which the record was generated, the
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure,
the degree of need for access, and whether there is an
express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or
other recognizable public interest militating toward
access.
150
Applying those factors to the case before it, the Third Circuit held that
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") could
access Westinghouse employees' medical records in order to investigate
the effects of a workplace toxin on employees as part of a larger effort to
develop national occupational safety and health standards. 151 The court
concluded that "the strong public interest in facilitating the research and
investigations of NIOSH" justified what was a minimal intrusion into
Westinghouse employees' privacy rights.
152
It would be inappropriate, here, to suggest that courts use one of the
three standards of judicial review-rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or
strict scrutiny-to test government action that is alleged to violate an
individual's right to avoid disclosure of medical records. Rather, courts
employ a balancing test-they weigh the state's interest in disclosure
against the individual's privacy interest, taking into consideration the
various factors outlined above. 153 While this balancing resembles rational
basis review, to define it as such would be to mischaracterize the approach
courts have taken to medical-record disclosure cases. The same is true for
Fourth Amendment warrantless search cases, in which courts employ a
''special needs" analysis-distinct from any of the three standards of
judicial review-to test the disputed government action. 154
Parents bringing suit on behalf of their newborns will likely argue, as
did the patients and physicians in Whalen, that the mere existence in
readily available form of information about newborns' genotype
149 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
150 
Id.
151 Id. at 580.
152 Id.
13 Id. at 578.
154 See infra text accompanying notes 177-83.
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constitutes a violation of newborns' right to avoid disclosure of personal
matters. 155  Parents will argue that the public disclosure of their child's
genotype could result in social stigmatization, employment discrimination,
or insurance discrimination.
The Whalen court was not persuaded by concerns regarding
employment and insurance discrimination. While a child who tests
positive for the MAOA-low genotype is a risk to employ and, to a lesser
extent, a risk to insure, states have taken significant steps to ensure the
confidentiality of genetic information. 156  The federal government, too,
recognizing the need for regulation regarding insurer and employer access
to genetic testing and subsequent treatment, has implemented various
measures that safeguard patient privacy rights in an era of genetic
screening, including the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 157 the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"),158 and the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA").159
Courts are more likely to be attentive to concerns that public disclosure
of an abnormal test will result in social stigma and personal anguish.
These concerns are not new to the arena of genetic testing, but they are
perhaps amplified where a state is testing for the MAOA-low genotype.
Scholars have expressed doubts that laws can "be used to limit the
potentially negative social consequences of labeling" children.1 60  Even
where states have taken significant precautions to ensure the
confidentiality of test results, those results may become available to others,
either because of a simple mistake, poor data-handling protocols and
155 Indeed, parents might argue that such a database is a violation of their own right to avoid
disclosure of personal matters since information about a newborn's genetic makeup necessarily imparts
information about the parents' genetic makeup.
156 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1977).
15' Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
158 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2006).
159 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (Supp. II 2009);
Gregory Katz & Stuart O. Schweitzer, Implications of Genetic Testing and Health Policy, 10 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 90, 103-05, 108 (2010). This, of course, ignores the argument that
employers and insurers will discriminate in spite of the law. Economist David Friedman argues that
where insurers no longer have the option of testing applicants and pricing insurance accordingly, they
will charge all customers a high-risk premium. Low-risk-for this Note's purposes, MAOA-high-
individuals will not be able to purchase insurance unless they are willing to pay more than the actuarial
value of their risk. MAOA-high buyers could solve the problem by providing guarantees that they are
MAOA-high. Those who are MAOA-low will not be able to provide such guarantees and thus the
insurer will conclude that they are MAOA-low and either charge them a higher premium or deny them
coverage. The same argument applies in the employment context. MAOA-highjob applicants will be
eager to provide guarantees that they are MAOA high. Those who are MAOA-low will be unable to
provide such guarantees and the employer will conclude that they are MAOA-low and not hire them.
DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS To Do WITH LAW AND WHY IT
MATTERS 69-73 (2000).
160 Foral, supra note 94, at 118.
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practices, or future legislation. 161  A child who tests positive for the
MAOA-low genotype might be labeled a monster-a kind of Mr. Hyde.
There is, then, a danger that the child will internalize that label-that
an abnormal test will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Or if not a self-
fulfilling prophecy, a source of considerable self-doubt and mental
anguish: "The belief that a negative event is genetically mandated [may]
result[] in decreased self-esteem and feelings of hopelessness and
depression.,
162
Despite these significant concerns, a court is not likely to invalidate the
proposed legislation. A state's compelling interest in testing and offering
supportive services to MAOA-low children justifies what is a minimal
intrusion into newborns' privacy rights, especially given the significant
measures taken to ensure the confidentiality of test results and federal and
state legislation in place to ensure that disclosed test results are not
misused.
2. Independence in Making Important Decisions
In Roe v. Wade,16 3 the Supreme Court recognized a "right of privacy"
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty that
was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." 164  And the Court in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health165 held that a person has a constitutionally
protected right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 166  The Court's
decisions affording individuals independence from government
interference in making important decisions are restricted to matters relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
education, and bodily integrity. 167 In Paul v. Davis,168 for example, the
Court denied an individual's claim for protection against the disclosure of
his arrest on a shoplifting charge on the grounds that his claim was not
161 Id.
162 Stone, supra note 55, at 1566.
163 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
164 Id. at 153; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 185-86 (1973) (holding that Georgia abortion
statutes that forced the petitioner "either to relinquish 'her right to decide when and how many children
she will bear' or to seek an abortion that was illegal ... invaded her rights of privacy and liberty in
matters related to family, marriage, and sex, and deprived her of the right to choose whether to bear
children[,] ... guaranteed her by the... Fourteenth Amendment[]").
165 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
166 Id. at 278.
167 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (affirming a right to privacy in marriage);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (affirming a right to privacy in procreation and
contraception); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (affirming a right to privacy in
bodily integrity); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (affirming a right to privacy
in family relationships and child rearing); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (affirming
a right to privacy in education).
168 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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based upon any challenge to the state's ability to restrict his freedom of
action in a sphere contended to be "private." '169
An individual's right to independence from government interference in
making important decisions-even in those spheres contended to be
private-is not absolute. 170  In Washington v. Glucksberg,171 the Court
acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a fundamental
right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment, but refused to carve
out of the Fourteenth Amendment a fundamental "right to die," or more
specifically, a right to physician-assisted suicide. 172 The Court then held
that Washington's assisted-suicide ban was rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. 173 Washington had an "unqualified interest
in the preservation of human life" as well as an interest in protecting
vulnerable groups from "abuse, neglect, and mistakes;" the assisted-suicide
ban was "at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection.,
174
A court confronted with a Fourteenth Amendment privacy-rights
challenge to MAOA screening would, where the allegation is that the
legislation impairs the claimant's independence in making important
decisions, first determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a
fundamental right to refuse unwanted genetic testing. As the Supreme
Court asserted in Glucksberg, it will not unsparingly carve fundamental
rights out of the Fourteenth Amendment. 175  While the Fourteenth
Amendment does guarantee a fundamental right to one's own bodily
integrity, it is unlikely that a court would view a cheek swab as an invasion
of a newbom's bodily integrity. 17 6 In the absence of a fundamental right,
the legislation is subject to rational basis review which, as has already been
established, it should survive.
169 Id. at 713.
170 See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) ("As against the right of an
individual that his person be held inviolable.., must be set the interests of society .... "); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (balancing an individual's liberty interest in declining an
unwanted smallpox vaccine against the state's interest in preventing disease).
17' 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
172 Id. at 721, 722 n. 17, 728.
1731 Id. at 735.
174 Id. at 728, 731, 735 (emphasis added) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 282 (1990)).
17' Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727.
176 In Rochin v. California, the Court held that Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs violated a
man's fundamental right to bodily integrity as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment when they
grabbed and squeezed him by the neck, shoved their fingers in his mouth, handcuffed him, and brought
him to the emergency room. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). In the emergency room, he was then strapped
to an operating table and had a tube forcibly placed in his mouth and into his stomach in order to obtain
capsules he had swallowed when the deputies had attempted to search his apartment. Id. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Court, decried the deputies' behavior as that which "shocks the
conscience," clearly in violation of the claimant's substantive due process rights. Id.
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D. Fourth Amendment Right Against Unlawful Search and Seizure
The "ultimate measure of [the] constitutionality of a governmental
search is 'reasonableness.' 177 In the context of a criminal investigation,
reasonableness requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant, which cannot
be issued without a showing of probable cause. 178  A warrant is not
required, however, to establish the reasonableness of all government
searches: "[I]n those exceptional circumstances in which special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable, . . . a court [is] entitled to
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers."
179
Where the government alleges a "special need" to conduct the
warrantless search at issue, courts will engage in a "context-specific
inquiry," balancing the competing public and private interests advanced by
the parties. 18° On the public side of the weighing scale lies the nature and
"immediacy" of the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of the
government's means for addressing that concern. 181  "Immediacy" means
the relative urgency of solving the problem. In Vernonia, for example, the
Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the school district, which had
enacted a program of random drug testing for all student-athletes, was
confronted by a "three-fold increase in classroom disruptions and
disciplinary [problems];" and that "disciplinary actions had reached
'epidemic proportions.' ' 182 On the private side of the weighing scale lies
the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes and the
character of the intrusion complained of.
183
The practical application of the "special needs" doctrine is limited to
two sets of circumstances: where the government acts to safeguard the
public health, welfare, and safety, 184 and where the government acts in loco
177 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
178Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
179 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
180 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997). In the absence of a special need, the analysis
goes no further. Id.
181 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660. The Court in Vernonia pointed out that the government need not
demonstrate a "compelling need" to enact the search at issue-that is, if, by "compelling need," one
means a "fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern." Rather, the government need only
demonstrate an interest important enough to justify the particular search at issue. Id. at 661.
182 Id. at 649.
183 Id. at 654, 658.
184 See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1989) (holding that
the government's interest in preventing the risk to the life of citizens posed by the potential use of
deadly force by U.S. Customs drug interdiction personnel suffering from impaired perception and
judgment justifies the use of a warrantless drug-testing program for such personnel); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (holding that the government's interest in
regulating the conduct of railroad employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks in order to ensure the
safety of the traveling public and of the employees themselves justifies the use of a warrantless drug-
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parentis to protect the health and safety of schoolchildren under its
supervision.
185
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,186 the Supreme
Court held that the government's substantial interest in deterring drug use
among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the United
States Customs Service presented a "special need" that justified departure
from Fourth Amendment warrant and probable-cause requirements.1 87 The
government had implemented a screening program which required a
urinalysis test for employees who sought transfer or promotion to positions
involving drug interdiction, firearms, or classified material. 188 The Court
asserted that requiring probable cause in the context of routine
administrative functions where the government "[sought] to prevent the
development of hazardous conditions" was at least impractical.1 89 The
government's screening program was justified because the hazardous
conditions the government sought to prevent were substantial-nothing
less than "veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by the
smuggling of illicit narcotics"-and the invasion complained of was
minimal in light of the diminished expectation of privacy of Customs
employees directly involved in the interdiction of drugs.190
testing program); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874-75 (1987) (holding that the government's
interest in protecting the community from at-large probationers justifies a program of supervision of
probationers that departs from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements).
185 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (holding that a school district policy
requiring students to consent to drug testing in order to participate in extracurricular activities was a
reasonable means of furthering the school district's interest in preventing and deterring drug use among
schoolchildren); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 (holding that a school district policy requiring random drug
testing of student-athletes was a reasonable means of furthering the school district's interest in
preventing and deterring drug use among schoolchildren); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334
(1985) (holding that a school's interest in maintaining an environment in which learning can take place
justifies a school official's warrantless search of a student who is under the school's authority).
186 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
187 Id. at 666.
188 Id. at 660-61.
189 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added).
190 Id. at 668, 672. Compare this result with the Court's holding in Skinner that blood and urine
tests were unquestionably searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment:
In light of our society's concern for the security of one's person, it is obvious
that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing
chemical analysis of the [blood] sample to obtain physiological data is a further
invasion of the tested employee's privacy interests .... It is not disputed ... that
chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private facts
about an employee .... Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting a
sample to be tested ... itself implicates privacy interests .... [T]hese intrusions
must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17.
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In Vernonia, the Court held that, considering the substantial nature of
the government need advanced, the "relative unobtrusiveness" of the
search effected, and students' diminished expectation of privacy, random
urinalysis drug testing of student-athletes was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus constitutional. 191 Justice
Scalia, in an opinion that reflected the concerns he voiced in his dissenting
opinion in Von Raab, highlighted the real, substantial, and pressing nature
of the problem alleged by the school district.192  The Court further
emphasized the strict procedures in place to both preserve student-athletes'
privacy and prevent against public disclosure of test results. 193 Finally, the
Court discussed at length the diminished expectation of privacy of
students:
[U]nemancipated minors lack some of the most
fundamental rights of self-determination . . . . When
parents place minor children in . . . schools for their
education, the teachers and administrators of those schools
stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to
them.... [T]he nature of that power is custodial and
tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control
that could not be exercised over free adults.
194
The Supreme Court defined the boundaries of the "special needs"
doctrine in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.1 95 In that case, the Court held
that a state hospital could not perform a nonconsensual blood test on
pregnant patients in order to obtain evidence of cocaine use for law
enforcement purposes. 196 While the government interest in using the threat
of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine was
substantial, it was not compelling enough to justify a departure from the
Fourth Amendment warrant and probable-cause requirements. 197  The
Court reasoned, first, that the invasion of privacy was "far more
substantial" than in Von Raab, Skinner-discussed below-or Vernonia.
In those cases, there was "no misunderstanding about the purpose of the
191 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
192 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I joined the Court's opinion [in
Skinner] because the demonstrated frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted class of
employees, and the demonstrated connection between such use and grave harm, rendered the search a
reasonable means of protecting society. I decline to join the Court's opinion in the present case
because neither frequency of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely."); see also
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
193 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650-51.
194 Id. at 654-55.
19' 532 U.S. 67 (2001).196 Id. at 84, 86.
197 Id. at 70, 85.
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test or its potential use." 198  Second, hospital patients do not have a
diminished expectation of privacy as do employees who routinely confront
hazardous situations or students in the custody of school officials.
199
Finally, the testing program at issue was not, in fact, divorced from law
enforcement purposes, but rather went hand-in-hand with law enforcement.
Ultimately, the Court asserted, "the gravity of the threat alone cannot be
dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers
may employ to pursue a given purpose.
200
The MAOA screening legislation proposed herein will obtain a
newborn's cell sample by buccal smear which, while not physically
intrusive in the ways that a blood test is, constitutes a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court in Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass 'n held that a blood test administered to
railroad employees involved in certain train accidents was a search under
the Fourth Amendment-first, because it was a "physical intrusion,
penetrating beneath the skin," and second, because it was followed by a
chemical analysis of the employee's blood to obtain physiological data.
20 1
The Ninth Circuit, following Skinner, concluded that a buccal smear-an
"inva[sion of] the interior of the body" to obtain a subject's DNA-was a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 20 2 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,
too, have held that a buccal smear is a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.2 °3
The state action here clearly falls within the limited circumstances in
which the courts have permitted warrantless searches: the state is acting to
safeguard the health, welfare, and safety of its residents and acting in loco
parentis to protect the health and safety of MAOA-low children, who may
suffer serious mental and emotional consequences in the absence of
essential support services. Thus a court confronted with a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the newborn screening program should subject
the legislation to the "special needs" analysis.
As discussed at length above, the problem posed to states by
maltreated, MAOA-low males is real and substantial. This bodes well for
the proposed legislation under a "special needs" analysis, especially since
198 Id. at 78.
199 
Id.
200 Id. at 86 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42-43 (2000)).
201 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
202 Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2009) ("There is no question that the buccal
swab constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment."); see also Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d
1437, 1449 (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against "all searches that invade the interior
of the body-whether by a needle that punctures the skin or a visual intrusion into a body cavity").
203 Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that swabbing the inside of
the mouth for saliva is a search); Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the collection of saliva is a search).
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the population subject to government action is composed of children-over
whom the state may exercise a greater degree of supervision and control.
The test articulated in Vernonia, however, requires that the state's urgency
in solving the problem by maltreated, MAOA-low males be
"immediate." 204  In Vernonia, this requirement was satisfied because
student-athlete drug use was causing a quantifiable-indeed, an
"epidemic"-increase in classroom disruptions. 20 5
The question of immediacy poses the greatest threat to the proposed
MAOA screening legislation. Because the research that asserts a cause-
and-effect relationship between MAOA-low, maltreated males and violent
crime is relatively new, and because the MAOA-low genotype is not
widely screened-for, the body of evidence that supports the connection
between the genotype and violent crime is still small. In his dissenting
opinion in Von Raab, Justice Scalia demanded that there be a "well-known
or demonstrated evil[] . . . with well-known or demonstrated
consequences" before the Court permits warrantless bodily searches. 20 6 He
emphasized that absent from the government's justifications for the
warrantless search at issue-"noticeably absent, revealingly absent, and as
far as I am concerned dispositively absent-[was] ... the recitation of even
a single instance in which any of the speculated horribles actually
occurred., 20 7 Perhaps, then, Bradley Waldroup's case saves the proposed
legislation from invalidation. The slaying he committed is an instance in
which a "speculated horrible" occurred. Even without the Waldroup
killing though, one can reasonably argue that the problem posed to states
by maltreated, MAOA-low males is also a kind of epidemic, especially
given the devastating tangible and intangible costs of violent crime.
VI. TIE CASE AGAINST MANDATORY SERVICES
Mandatory newborn screening for the MAOA-low genotype should
survive constitutional scrutiny in large measure because an effective
treatment exists-early intervention services-for the antisocial behavior
to which the genotype predisposes males. That begs the question: if the
treatment is so effective and its objective so important, why not mandate
it? Indeed, there is some case law that suggests that a court would uphold
legislation mandating that families with MAOA-low children participate in
early intervention services. This Part first argues that mandatory programs
might be permissible under Wyman v. James.20 8 Section VI.B then goes on
to show why mandating that an MAOA-low child's family participate in
204 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660-63 (1995).
205 Id. at 663.206 Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 683.
208 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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early intervention services would not survive constitutional scrutiny.
A. Permissibility of Early Intervention Services Under Wyman
In Wyman, the Supreme Court held that a beneficiary of the program
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") could not refuse a
home visit by an AFDC caseworker without risking the termination of her
benefits. 20 9 The beneficiary contended that the home visit was a search,
and when not consented to or supported by a warrant, violated her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.210
The Court acknowledged that a case involving "a home and some sort of
official intrusion into that home" gave rise to an "immediate and
natural... concern about Fourth Amendment rights.21 But the Court
concluded that such a "protective attitude" was not justified in this case
because the home visit at issue was not a "search" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.212  First, the visit's purpose was primarily
rehabilitative. The Court criticized what it perceived as the beneficiary's
attempts to overstate the investigative nature of the visit, arguing that the
visit could not be equated with a traditional criminal search.213 Second, the
visit was neither forced nor compelled. If the beneficiary were to deny
214permission, no search would have taken place. Even if the visit were a
search, the Court continued, it was not unreasonable and thus did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
21 5
The Court gave several reasons in support of its conclusion. The Court
noted that the visit was rehabilitative as opposed to investigative; 216 that
the AFDC caseworker was "not a sleuth" whose purpose was to investigate
a crime or apprehend its perpetrator, but rather "a friend to one in need"
whose primary concern was the welfare of the beneficiary; 217 and, finally,
that there was no real "intrusion" into the home.218 The beneficiary was
given written notice of the visit well in advance and the caseworker did not
2
19 Id. at 326.
210 Id. at 313. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of individuals "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST., amend.
IV.
211 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 316.
2 12 Id. at 317.
213 Id. at 323.
2 14 Id. at 317.
215 Id. at 318 ("It is unreasonableness which is the Fourth Amendment's standard.").
216 Id. at 323. The Court underscored that a home visit was not a criminal investigation-that is,
not undertaken in the context of any criminal proceeding. Id. The Court admitted that a crime might
be discovered and that criminal prosecution might follow, but dismissed that possibility as "a routine
and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which necessarily ensues upon any
other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct." Id.
217 Id.
211 Id at 321.
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engage in "snooping.
219
The government could invoke Wyman in defense of legislation
mandating early intervention services for MAOA-low children and their
families. A home visit by an ongoing service coordinator would be
primarily rehabilitative; the ongoing service coordinator would serve more
as a friend than sleuth; and there would be no real intrusion into the home.
Like families who receive AFDC, families who participate in Part C early
intervention services would be given written notice of home visits well in
advance.
B. Problems with Wyman
However, there is reason to believe the Court would seize an
opportunity to overturn Wyman. The decision sparked immediate
controversy. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, penned a
vehement dissent, arguing that the decision was inconsistent with the
Court's previous Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-particularly the
"unbroken line of cases" which held that, "subject to a few narrowly drawn
exceptions, any search without a warrant [was] constitutionally
unreasonable., 220 Justice Marshall also rejected the majority's depiction of
the home visit as a "purely benevolent inspection[,]" stating, "[o]f course,
caseworkers seek to be friends, but the point is that they are also required
to be sleuths. 22 1  Information gathered and transmitted to the state by
caseworkers could result in the imposition of civil penalties, including the
22termination of parental rights, or criminal convictions2 Finally, Justice
Marshall derided the majority's apparent conclusion that "valid Fourth
Amendment consent [could] be given under the threat of the loss of one's
sole means of support."
223
Since then, the case has been the subject of much criticism.224 A series
of decisions in the 1970s and 1980s cast Wyman as an outlier, "a decision
so poorly reasoned and at odds with allied precedent that its holding must
be limited to the narrowest plausible construction."
225
Second, the facts in Wyman can be distinguished from those under
219 Id. at 21 ("Forcible entry or entry under false pretenses or visiting outside working hours or
snooping in the home are forbidden.... All this minimizes any 'burden' upon the homeowner's right
against unreasonable intrusion.").
220 Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
221 Id. at 339.
222 See id. at 340 (arguing that appellant James's case for Fourth Amendment protection is strong
because the home visit at issue could result in a criminal conviction).
223 Id. at 344.
2 24 See Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and
the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 368-74 (2010) (discussing the inconsistencies and
shortcomings of the Wyman decision).
225 Id at 373.
2011]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
consideration here. The majority argued that the home visit at issue was
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. If the
beneficiary were to deny the caseworker permission to enter her home, the
caseworker could not enter. The beneficiary would risk the termination of
her benefits. Marshall's dissent pointed out the injustice inherent in such a
choice; the Court was essentially asking a woman to choose between her
fundamental rights and her family's livelihood.
The facts under consideration here suggest an even uglier choice.
Families required to participate in early intervention services would not
receive anything in return for their participation-other than various
supportive services, of course. Their participation would be mandated by
the state for the benefit of the state. What consequence would confront
families who refused to allow an ongoing service coordinator to conduct a
home visit? One likely possibility would be removal of the child from the
home. The state's position might be characterized as follows: if you have a
child with a genotype that predisposes him to violent psychopathy and you
are not going to participate in an early intervention program as prescribed
by law, the state is not going to assume the risk that the child becomes a
violent criminal. Instead, the state is going to remove the child.226  The
court would emphasize the gravity of such a consequence, and would
almost undoubtedly invalidate the mandate.
C. Other Reasons Disfavoring Mandatory Services
Beyond the reasons already discussed, there are other good reasons to
offer, but not mandate, supportive services. First, families are more likely
to participate wholeheartedly in a program when they are not being
compelled to do so. Second, states are more likely to fund a program that
does not require them to offer services to thirty-three percent of families
who have given birth annually.
226 Whether a MAOA-low child should be removed from the home based upon evidence that the
child is being maltreated is a complicated question. At least two scholars have suggested that the bar
for removal should be set lower for MAOA-low children, reasoning, accurately, that subjecting these
children to abuse and neglect would result in greater harm to society and to the children, themselves.
See Stone, supra note 55, at 1578; David Wasserman, Is There Value in Identifying Individual Genetic
Predispositions to Violence?, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 24, 28 (2004). But removal may do more harm
than good for vulnerable MAOA-low children, because the process is more likely to cause
psychological harm to an MAOA-low child. See Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious
Effect of Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 540, 542 (2004)
(explaining that rates of abuse and neglect are higher in foster care than in the general population).
Additionally, setting the bar lower for removal of MAOA-low children is likely to "siphon resources
and exacerbate problems within an already strained system, leading to other new harms-such
as... additional missed cases of fatal child maltreatment." 1d; see also Stone, supra note 55, at 1586.
Despite all this, courts may be more likely to remove MAOA-low males from their parents. However,
a comprehensive discussion of the consequences of the proposed legislation for the child welfare
system is beyond the scope of this Note.
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VII. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE PROGRAM
State legislatures are likely to balk in the face of proposals to dip into
already depleted coffers to fund expensive, experimental social programs.
The proposed legislation will substantially increase the cost of states'
newborn screening and early intervention programs. However, even a
rudimentary cost-benefit analysis demonstrates that, by reducing the
percentage of violent crimes committed, the proposed legislation is likely
to save states millions of dollars. The remainder of this Part provides such
an analysis based on data from the state of Connecticut.
A. The Costs of the Program
A DNA-based test for the MAOA-low genotype currently costs
$250.227 Compare that to $39.20-the current cost per newborn of
Connecticut's newborn screening program.228 Experience suggests that the
cost of the test would likely decrease substantially in a screening setting,229
perhaps as much as eighty percent, to approximately $40.230
In 2009 there were approximately 40,000 children born in Connecticut.
To screen each of these for the MAOA-low genotype would have cost the
state of Connecticut $1.6 million-doubling the cost of the state's newborn
screening program. Of these 40,000 children, approximately 6600 were
likely MAOA-low. 231  And of these 6600 MAOA-low children,
approximately 2400 were likely to have suffered maltreatment as defined
by Caspi et al. and Foley et al.232
Under the proposed legislation, Connecticut would offer Part C early
intervention services to the families of all 6600 MAOA-low children. For
the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that fifty percent of these
families will accept. Given that the average cost per child of early
intervention services is an estimated $8700 for a year of services,233 and
227 E-mail from Dr. William Bernet, Prof., Dep't Psychiatry, Vanderbilt University School of
Medicine, to author (Nov. 1, 2010, 13:05 EST) (on file with author).
228 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 35.
229 E-mail from Dr. William Bernet, supra note 227.
230 In recent years, the cost of a paternity test has decreased by eighty percent-from $450 to
approximately $80. GENETIC TESTING LABORATORIES, INC., http://www.gtldna.com (last visited July
8, 2011). Perhaps counter-intuitively, this decrease in cost has been driven primarily by the increase in
demand for such tests. Id. A corresponding decrease in the cost of a test for the MAOA-low genotype,
reasonable to expect in a screening setting, would see test prices fall from $250 to approximately $40.
231 Six-thousand-six-hundred represents approximately thirty-three percent of all male children
born in Connecticut in 2009. Recall that only a negligible percentage of females, less than 2.5%, are
affected by the MAOA-low genotype. See supra text accompanying note 69.
232 Caspi et al. found that approximately twelve percent of the male cohort was both maltreated
and MAOA-low. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 88.
233 Julie E. Tanf & W.S. Barnett, A Cost Analysis of Part C Early Intervention Services in New
Jersey, 24 J. EARLY INTERVENTION 45, 50 (2001).
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that Part C provides services for children from birth through age three, the
cost to Connecticut of providing Part C early intervention services to all
accepting families would be approximately $86.1 million for those children
born in 2009.234
The cost to Connecticut of the proposed legislation, then-mandatory
newborn screening for the MAOA-low genotype followed by Part C early
intervention services for those families with children who test positive for
the genotype-would be approximately $87.7 million.
B. The Costs of Violent Crime
As outlined above, every aggravated assault costs states $145,379;
every rape costs $448,532; and every murder costs $17,252,656.235 In
2009, there were 5760 aggravated assaults in Connecticut, 651 rapes, and
107 murders. 236  Given these figures, the cost of violent crime toConnecticut in 2009 was approximately $3 billion.
C. The Benefits of the Program
Recall that of the estimated 6600 MAOA-low children born in
Connecticut in 2009, approximately 2400 will suffer maltreatment. Recall
also, that for the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that fifty percent of
families with children who test positive for the MAOA-low genotype will
accept services. It is unlikely that the parents of all 2400 MAOA-low
children who are destined to suffer maltreatment will be among the 3300
parents accepting services. Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that parents
who are likely to maltreat their children are unlikely to accept supportive
services and supervision. This, of course, is one of the drawbacks of
offering and not mandating services.
Because there is no way of knowing exactly how many MAOA-
low/maltreated children will be among those receiving services, this
analysis considers low-end (25%), middle (50%), and high-end (75%)
estimates. The low-end estimate, for example, assumes that of the 3300
families receiving services, 600 of these will have been likely to maltreat
their MAOA-low child.
This analysis also assumes, following Caspi et al., that maltreated,
MAOA-low children account for forty-four percent of violent convictions.
234 Connecticut currently spends $53 million on its Part C early intervention program. The federal
government, under the IDEA, offers the state approximately $4 million to offer the entitlement to its
residents. Interview with Linda Goodman, supra note 76. It is inaccurate, however, to assume that the
proposed legislation would simply add $86.1 million to Connecticut's Part C expenditures because,
undoubtedly, some of those children already being served are MAOA-low.
235 See supra text accompanying note 90.
236 CONNECTICUT CRIME RATES 1960-2009, http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/ctcrime.htm
(last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
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If the families of all 2400 MAOA-low children, then, were to accept
services, and if services were one-hundred percent effective, one would
expect a forty-four percent reduction in violent crime and a corresponding
decrease in the costs of violent crime. Table 1 presents a range of
estimates of the savings to the state of Connecticut given different levels of
program efficacy.
Table 1.
Percent Reduction in Violent Crime, Corresponding Reduction in
Costs of Violent Crime, and Savings to Connecticut from Proposed
Legislation
No. Families Percentage of Percentage of
w Violent ViolentCrime EIS Efficacy No.cessfully CrimeAcceptance Maltreated Committed Ratio Committed
Rate Child Commi TreatedAccepting By This By This
EtiS Group Group
75% 1800 33% 50% 900 16.5%
25% 450 8.25%
50% 1200 22% 50% 600 11%
25% 300 5.5%
25% 600 11% 50% 300 5.5%
25% 150 2.75%
Table 1 (cont'd).
Estimated PresentCosts of Reduction in Value ofCosts of Reduction in Costs of Estimated
ETS Efficacy Violent Crime Costs of Csso rpsd Svnst
Raio t Cnncict ilet Costs of Proposed Savings toRatio to Connecticut Violent
in 2009 Crime to Violent Legislation Connecticut
Connecticut Crime toConnecticut
50% $2,975,411,564 $490,942,908 $228,412,591 $87,730,000 $140,682,591
25% $2,975,411,564 $245,471,454 $114,206,295 $87,730,000 $26,476,295
50% $2,975,411,564 $327,295,272 $152,275,060 $87,730,000 $64,545,060
25% $2,975,411,564 $163,647,636 $76,137,530 $87,730,000 ($11,592,470)
50% $2,975,411,564 $163,647,636 $76,137,530 $87,730,000 ($11,592,470)
25% $2,975,411,564 $81,823,818 $38,068,765 $87,730,000 ($49,661,235)
If, for example, of the 3300 families accepting early intervention
services, 1800 (75% of 2400) are those who would likely have mistreated
their MAOA-low child, and if the early intervention program is fifty
percent effective at preventing the maltreatment that causes MAOA-low
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children to become violent offenders, Connecticut would see an estimated
16.5% reduction in the percentage of violent crime. Such a reduction in
the percentage of violent crime would save Connecticut approximately
$140.7 million.237 If, however, the program captured fewer of those
families likely to mistreat their MAOA-low child-600 (25% of 2,400)-
and if the program were only 25% effective, Connecticut would see only
an estimated 2.75% reduction in the percentage of violent crime, and the
program would cost the state approximately $49.7 million.
This analysis demonstrates that the benefits to the state of enacting the
proposed legislation are very closely tied to the ability of the program to
capture and serve those families likely to mistreat their MAOA-low child,
as well as to the program's ability to prevent the maltreatment that causes
MAOA-low children to become violent offenders.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In science-fiction writer Philip K. Dick's short story, Minority Report,
murders are prevented by the means of three mutants, "precogs," who can
predict the future. 238  This is "precrime"-a system which incarcerates
people for murders they will one day commit.239 It goes without saying
that the American constitutional order would reject such a system, despite
its legitimate objective. Scientific research on the MAOA gene provides
society with the knowledge and tools necessary to achieve that same
objective, the prevention of violent crime, without significantly infringing
on individuals' rights. Indeed, this Note proposes more than a means to
prevent violent crime-it proposes a possible solution to the problem of
prison overcrowding confronting California and eighteen other states as
well. 240 An obvious consequence of large-scale crime prevention, after all,
is a dramatic decline in states' prison populations.
Rather than spending billions of dollars on new-prison construction
and the other many and varied costs of violent crime, states should add a
screening test for the MAOA-low genotype to their newborn screening
programs and offer early intervention services to families with children
237 Connecticut, of course, would not derive this benefit until approximately twenty years after it
had invested in the screening/supportive services program and therefore cost-reduction figures have
been discounted at 3.9%. See THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DISCOUNT RATES FOR
COST-EFFECTIVENESS, LEASE PURCHASE, & RELATED ANALYSES, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars a094/a94_appx-c (presenting a forecast of nominal discount rates to be used in cost-
effectiveness and like analyses).
23
8 PHILIP K. DICK, The Minority Report, in THE MINORITY REPORT AND OTHER CLASSIC
STORIES BY PHILIP K. DICK 72 (1987).239 Id. at 72.
240 Supreme Court Rules California Must Alleviate Overcrowding in Prisons, NPR (May 23,
2011), http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2 11/05/23/pm-supreme-court-rules-california-
must-alleviate-prison-overcrowding/.
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who test positive for the genotype. Not only could such a program prevent
violent crime and reduce prison populations, but it could also enrich
individuals' lives by providing at-risk children and their families with
essential support services.

